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Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See
the Forest and the Trees
fby Jeffrey S. Lubbers*
o issue pervaded the debates lead-
ing to the passage of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act more than
the appropriateness of administrative agency
adjudication and the proper role of the
hearing officer.
In the late 1930's a special committee of
the American Bar Association, concerned
about agency use of untrained, easily influ-
enced, subordinate employees to preside
over hearings, warned that "a combination
oflegislative, executive, andjudicial power
should not be exercised by the same group
of Federal officers and employees." '2 The
committee proposed a Federal administra-
tive court with both appellate and trial juris-
diction, composed of 41 justices plus a
number of "commissioners" to hear tes-
timony. This view received a stimulus by
President Roosevelt's Committee on
Administrative Management which not only
concluded that independent agencies
"constitute a headless 'fourth branch' of
the Government," but also recommended
that the agencies be divided into separate
administrative and judicial sections.' Focus
on the role of the hearing officer was height-
ened by a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions beginning with the first Morgan case's
proclamation that, "The one who decides
must hear."'
In 1939 the debate came to a head for
the first time. The ABA had withdrawn its
support for an administrative court bill and
had instead thrown its weight behind the
Walter-Logan bill which provided for use
of hearing boards in single-headed agen-
cies, and hearing examiners in multi-headed
agencies with a system of intensive admin-
istrative and judicial review.I The bill was
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passed by Congress but President Roose-
velt vetoed it in strong terms as motivated
by "a combination of lawyers who desire
to have all processes of government con-
ducted through lawsuits and of interests
which desire to escape regulation." He also
complained that "a large part of the legal
profession has never reconciled itself to the
existence of the administrative tribunal.
Many of them prefer the stately ritual of
courts, in which lawyers play all the speak-
ing parts, to the simple procedure of admin-
istrative hearings which a client can under-
stand and even participate in. "I
In his veto message, President Roosevelt
announced that he was asking his Attorney
General to form a Committee on Admin-
istrative Procedure to study the operations
of the regulatory agencies. The Attorney
General's Committee, through its in-depth
study of the agencies, managed to remove
the bitterness from the debate, and though
differences remained among members as
to the feasibility of omnibus legislation, the
entire Committee did agree to the need to
"improve the process of formal adjudica-
tion by bringing about a more uniformly
high quality of hearing officers."'
In 1946, after the wartime interruption,
the complicated and compromise-laden
Administrative Procedure Act that we know
today was unanimously passed by both
Houses of Congress and signed by Presi-
dent Truman.' Commentators of the day
considered the Act's provisions regarding
hearing examiners to be among the most
important changes effected by the Act.9
And in the years following the passage of
the APA, much ink was spilled in trying to
apply the provisions of the new Act to the
incumbent hearing examiners in the var-
ious regulatory agencies.t0
Now in 1984, the inkwell is pumping again.
Although the Administrative Procedure Act
has remained essentially unchanged since
1946, the adjudication system it spawned
has undergone a rather striking transfor-
mation, and administrative law commen-
tators are again beginning to call for revi-
sions in the system." The purpose of this
article is to examine the contours of the
administrative adjudication system, to pro-
vide facts as to current agency caseload,
to alert readers to the broad variety of cases
handled by agency administrative lawjudges
(ALs) and other "non-ALJ" hearing offi-
cers and to consider how these trends affect
proposals to reform the system.
Trends from 1946 to 1984
As has been documented elsewhere, 2 the
steady growth in the number of Federal
ALJs has finally leveled off, but there are
still five times as many APA-appointed
administrative law judges in 1984 as there
were in 1947:
June, 1947: 1%
June, 1954: 278
July, 1962: 494
February, 1974: 792
January, 1979: 1071
January, 1980: 1146
June, 1981: 1119
October, 1982: 1183
April, 1983: 1158
June, 1984: 1121
But this increase masks the roiling that
is going on below the surface. In 1947 64%
(N = 125) of the total were concentrated in
the economic regulatory agencies and 6.6%
(N = 13) were in the Social Security Admin-
istration. At the end of 1978, 14.7% (N = 157)
were in the economic regulatory agencies
and 61.6% (N =660) in Social Security. By
1984 the original ratio was almost exactly
reversed with only 6.5% (N = 73) in the 12
economic regulatory agencies, while 67.8%
(N = 760) were in Social Security. In fact
three agencies (Social Security, National
Labor Relations Board and Department of
Labor) employ 85% (951) of the 1121 judges,
and 24 of the 29 agencies employ 12 or
fewer judges. During this period, labor
related ALJs also increased steadily from
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Agency Caseloads and ALI Positions 1978 versus 1983-84
Agency -'
Agriculture, Department of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Bur. of (Dept. of
Treasury)
Civil Aeronautics Board
Commerce, Department of" )
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Drug Enforcement Administration (Dept. of Justice)
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Food and Drug Administration (Dept. of H.H.S.)
Housing and Urban Development, Department of
Interior, Department of the' c)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Labor, Department of
Merit Systems Protection Board
National Labor Relations Board
National Transportation Safety Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission
Small Business Administration
Social Security Administration (Dept. of H.H.S.)
U.S. Coast Guard (Department of Transportation)
U.S. International Trade Commission
U.S. Postal Service
ALJs-1i79
5
1
17
3
4
1
1
6
14
23
4
7
12
12
1
1
8
61
49
1
98
6
I
47
8
0
660
16
2
2LM!!V
New cases filed
with ALJs-1978
247
96
93
19
336
4
31
104
127
137
(f)
88
2,147
17
3
131
1,513
1,371
2,769
2719)
5,378
568
10
4,331
30(h)
(a)
196,428
681
24
133
216,843
ALJs-6/84
5
1
4
I
4
0"'
6
12
21
II
6
12
8
9
1
9
10
84
3
107
5
3
22
6
1
760
11
2
4
1,121
New cases filed with
ALJs-1982* or 1983
250
107"
43
107*
858*
(a)
47
340
246
109
746
163
1,284
7
I*
37
500*
77
14,457
182
4,961
524
14
1,325
92
7
363,533
605
9*
477
391,108
Note: The 1978 figures are from "Fed-
eral Administrative Law Judge Hear-
ings-Statistical Report for 1976-1978"
Administrative Conference of the U.S.
(1980) pp. 21, 33. The 1984 ALJ totals
were supplied by the Office of Admin-
istrative Law Judges, U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, June 8, 1984.
The 1983 caseload figures were com-
piled by the author from agency
responses to Administrative Confer-
ence survey dated August 22, 1983.
Responses are on fie at the Adminis-
trative Conference. Where 1983 figures
were not available, 1982 figures were
used as noted. "New cases" denote only
those cases that reached the stage of
referral to the agency's office of ALJs
for potential hearing. A large percentage
of these cases are resolved prior to actual
hearing.
Footnotes
a. Agencies are only those employing
at least one full-time ALI during the
period. Other agencies that have
occasional APA hearings may bor-
row ALJs from other agencies, sub-
ject to approval by the Office of Per-
sonnel Management, 5 U.S.C. § 3344.
In 1983 such agencies reporting APA
hearings include the CPSC, Depart-
ment of Education, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal
Home Loan Bank Board and Federal
Reserve Board. Total cases amount
to about 75. No such figures are avail-
able for 1978.
b. 1978 figures are for Maritime Admin-
istration (later transferred to Depart-
ment of Transportation). 1984 figures
are primarily for National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration.
c. Does not include figures for Indian
probate cases (2083 new cases in 1978;
2961 in 1982) which are not subject
to the APA and are heard by 10 spe-
cial hearing officers, but which are
otherwise similar to ALJ cases.
d. The NRC's adjudicatory hearings are
presided over by three-member
Atomic Safety Licensing Boards
(drawn from a larger "panel"). One
of the three members is normally a
lawyer but need not be an AL. ALJs
serve on these boards and also pre-
side individually over antitrust and
civil penalty cases. Caseload figures
reflect all cases filed with the boards
and ALJs.
e. Corrected total; total in 1978 com-
pilation was erroneously given as
1070.
f. The FLRA was created in 1979. In
1978, equivalent cases under Exec-
utive Order 11491 were handled by
the Department of Labor. There were
251 new cases in that program in 1978.
g. The MSPB was created in 1979. Fig-
ures for 1978 are from the Civil Ser-
vice Commission.
h. This year was aberrational for the
SEC. Newcases forevery otheryear
between 1975 and 1983 were between
64 and 106.
i. The CPSC's ALJ position has
remained vacant since 1979.
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17.9% (N =35) in 1947 to 19.6% (N =210)
in 1979 to 21.1% (N =236) in 1984. 3
Even more dramatic than the shift in
"ALJ-power" is the correlative caseload
trend.4 As the accompanying table indi-
cates, the most dramatic development has
been the burgeoning Social Security case-
load (primarily disability cases) which has
jumped 85% to 363,533 new case filings
from 1978 to 1983. During this period, the
Labor Department has shown the largest
percentage jump as new filings increased
more than fivefold to 14,457-with much
of the increase represented by black lung
benefits cases and longshoremen's and har-
bor workers' compensation cases. Except
for these huge SSA and Labor Department
benefit programs, only the steadily flowing
NLRB unfair labor practice cases, and the
dwindling mine safety and occupational
safety and health enforcement cases
amounted to more than one thousand new
filings in 1983. Severe drop-offs from 1978
levels were experienced by the ICC, CAB,
FTC, and Interior, while other agency pro-
grams (most notably the CFTC's repara-
tions program, Commerce's fishery civil
penalty cases, the Postal Service's false
representation cases and the FLRA's Fed-
eral unfair labor practice cases) have shown
large percentage increases. Still it is ines-
capable that the administrative law judge
in today's Federal Government has become
less an organizer and initial decider of reg-
ulatory policy issues and more the (often-
final) dispenser of disability benefits or
arbiter of civil money penalties-cases
where factfinding, demeanor evidence,
fairness and speed are hallmarks, and pol-
icy issues absent or submerged."5
The Aid Corps Bill
This shift in the role of agency adjudi-
cation away from deciding regulatory pol-
icy issues, with increased emphasis on
"mass justice" cases has helped revive
proposals to separate agency adjudicators
from the rest of the agency. Already Con-
gress has followed this reasoning in several
specific enforcement programs involving a
high volume of fact-based cases: the
Department of Labor must enforce its mine
safety and occupational health and safety
programs by bringing violators before two
special independent adjudicatory agencies
that hear and decide challenges to the cita-
tions. 6 A third adjudicatory agency, the
National Transportation Safety Board hears
and decides pilot license denial, revocation
and suspension cases brought by the FAA. 7
And finally, the Merit Systems Protection
Board, with its system of 3 ALJs and
approximately 100 hearing officers hearing
various employee appeals, with review by
an independent board, is the most recent
example. 1
Proponents of separation would now
extend this principle to the entire corps of
administrative lawjudges. A proposal, sup-
ported by the Federal ALI professional
organization," to establish a nationwide
Corps of Federal Administrative Law Judges
has been introduced by Senator Howard
Heflin as S. 1275,20 and two hearings have
been held on the bill in the 98th Congress.2
The Heflin bill would remove the ALJs
from the supervision and control of the
agencies where they are currently employed
and transform them into an independent
unified corps. The concept of a unified corps
(which is in place in 8 states)22 has produced
some weighty, but still largely theoretical,
arguments for and against,23 and the Heflin
bill in particular has already been the sub-
ject of much spirited criticism and
approval.' The bill would not disturb the
agencies' ability to review ALJ initial deci-
sions, instead a trial bench would be cre-
ated outside the agencies, divided into divi-
sions;21 managed by a chief judge and divi-
sion chief judges who are selected by a
high-level nominating commission, with all
judges subject to an elaborate removal and
discipline procedure.26 Most of these details
have been aired sufficiently elsewhere, 27
but the makeup of the divisions in light of
current caseloads is worthy of examina-
tion.
"A proposal, supported by the
Federal AU professional
organization, 9 to establish a
nationwide Corps of Federal
Administrative Law Judges has
been introduced...
The bill specifies that from four to ten
divisions be created, with the exact number
and make up subject to adjustment at any
time by the "council" of the corps, com-
prised of the chief judge and the division
chief judges. Initially, however, the bill
establishes seven named divisions reflect-
ing various areas of specialization.
2
It is possible, using these divisions, and
projecting current agency judge positions
and caseload, to gain some idea of the size
and workloads of these divisions. Accord-
ing to a list of current agencies fitting within
these divisions, prepared by two support-
ers of the bill,26 the following sizes and
caseloads can be derived:
(1) Division of Communications, Public
Utility and Transportation Regula-
tion: 56 ALJs, 652 cases;
(2) Division of Health, Safety and Envi-
ronmental Regulation: 66 ALJs, 4685
cases;
(3) Division of Labor (sic): 84 AUs,
14,457 cases;
(4) Division of Labor Relations: 118
ALJs, 5707 cases;
(5) Division of Benefits Programs: 760
ALJs, 363,533 cases;
(6) Division of Securities, Commodities
and Trade Regulation: 25 ALJs, 1163
cases;
(7) Division of General Programs and
Grants: 12 ALJs, 858 cases.
This projection indicates one of the pri-
mary weaknesses of the proposed omnibus
ALI corps: two of the divisions, each swal-
lowing whole the existing ALI contingent
and caseload of an individual agency (SSA
and DOL), dwarf the rest of the corps.
Furthermore, a third division is simply an
amalgam of the NLRB and FLRA cases-
perhaps a sensible combination, but one
that Congress eschewed when it created
the FLRA in 1978. The remaining four divi-
sions do represent real consolidation and
potential savings and efficiencies, though
specialists in the various fields of law rep-
resented might have some difficulty in
accepting them.
The comprehensiveness of a corps
encompassing all current administrative law
judges is appealing, but I believe that the
lack of balance in the proposed divisions
and the real differences among the covered
agencies suggests the need for caution and
further analysis. As an initial point, I would
urge that it is foolish to try to assimilate
the Social Security Administration's ALJs
into the unified corps-even an anaconda
can't digest an elephant. Rather, any prob-
lems of real or perceived lack of decisional
independence0 on the part of the 760 SSA
ALJs who operate in 10 regional and 131
field offices throughout the United States"'
(including some bilingual judges in Puerto
Rico) deserve separate consideration. If the
problems are sufficiently documented, then
perhaps there is a need for an administra-
tive "Social Security Review Commis-
sion" with trial judges and reviewing offi-
cials totally separated from the rest of the
Department of HHS.' Such a court could
also be made into a more generalized dis-
ability and retirement benefits court, thereby
encompassing the similar black lung and
longshoremen's and habor workers' cases
in the Department of Labor, (still leaving
DOL with a relatively large residuum of
cases) and conceivably the non-APA cases
heard by the Board of Veterans Appeals
and the Railroad Retirement Board.
The Department of Labor's cases also
deserve special attention." As mentioned
above, Congress has already seen fit to
separate entirely two major adjudicative
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programs from DOL policymakers and
enforcers. And in the two largest programs
that are currently handled by DOL ALJs
(making up 85% of the office's 1983 APA
caseload) Congress has directed that agency
review be conducted by a separate review-
ing agency, the "Benefits Review Board"'
with a large, but not complete," degree of
internal independence. Congress could
easily move to make that independence
complete if it wished to.
As for the proposed Division of Labor
Relations, the two component agencies, the
NLRB and FLRA, are both structured so
that an independent general counsel has
complete discretion to bring cases before
the ALJs, creating an effective separation
between the prosecuting and judging func-
tions.w It might be argued that the possi-
bility of undue decisional pressure from
agency Members on ALJs is still present,
but the strong opposition to the Heflin bill
by NLRB Aids would seem to rebut any
such suggestion.37
Thus, using the Hefiin bill's proposed
divisions as a benchmark, three of the divi-
sions (Labor, Labor Relations, and Bene-
fits Programs) lose much of their appeal
when examined closely. The otherfour make
more sense, though I believe it is unnec-
essary at this time to include the four pre-
viously discussed adjudicatory agencies
(OSHRC, FMSHRC, NTSB and MSPB).
It is also arguably premature to include the
economic regulatory agencies, most of
which still have a medium volume of rel-
atively specialized cases, and most of which
are still adjusting to the effects of the dereg-
ulation movement which is tending to reduce
their caseloads while shifting their empha-
sis toward enforcement and away from ini-
tial licensing. These agencies would include
the CAB, EPA, FCC, FERC, FMC, FTC,
NRC and SEC. In effect, then, I would
whittle down the corps to an experimental
program, with one division-an expanded
"general programs division"-with Aids
from the following agencies:
Coast Guard I
Interior 9
Agriculture 5
CFTC 4
Postal Service 4
ITC 2
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms I
Commerce I
Drug Enforcement Admin. I
FDA I
HUD I
SBA 1
42 ALJs
This proposal is a slightly scaled down
version of an experimental corps to be
administered by the Office of Personnel
Management, that I proposed in 198138 and
that the Chairman of the Administrative
Conference, Loren Smith, suggested to
Senator Hefrin in 1983.Y As Chairman Smith
said, "Ifthese... ALJs (plus achiefjudge,
augmented by a few more judges who would
also cover agencies that occasionally need
an ALJ, but do not employ one full-time)
were transferred into a corps under OPM
control to service all but the specifically
excluded agencies, the idea would be put
to a good test.
The proposal did not, however, go
unchallenged. Joseph Morris, General
Counsel of OPM, testifying in opposition
to the Heflin bill, also criticized the exper-
iment as espoused by Mr. Smith:
My friend, Loren Smith, has suggested
an experiment that would exclude from a
corps the large bulk of the members of the
present administrative law judiciary, those
presiding over cases in SSA, the Depart-
ment of Labor, and the National Labor
Relations Board.
Interestingly, it is those administrative
law judges whose work falls most clearly
and most cleanly in the area of adjudicative
and quasi-adjudicative work in the execu-
tive branch as opposed to ratemaking, rule-
making, and other quasi-legislative activi-
ties in the executive branch.
Put otherwise, it is in the smaller agen-
cies, in the minority of members of the
existing administrative law judiciary, that
we find the most critical and the most appar-
ent need for subject matter expertise.
It is in the larger agencies employing
administrative law judges that there appears
on the face of it, under the principles moti-
vating the Administrative Procedure Act,
a greater fungibility ofjudges-fungibility
in the sense that less subject matter exper-
tise is required because the areas are less
technical or they are more akin to issues
that arise in common law proceedings.
So, it is our view that the proposal for
an experimental corps that would exclude
the large agencies employing AU's con-
tains an irony that ultimately defeats the
wisdom of the proposal, and that irony is
precisely that such an experiment would
focus on the fungibility of those AU's who
are least fungible and would exclude from
the scope of the experiment those AL's
who, among ALU's, are most fungible; that
is, who have the most adjudicative, least
regulatory or rulemaking work to do.
Therefore, we think that the proposed
experiment is ill-advised."
I believe that Mr. Morris' focus on "fun-
gibility" misses the point of the experiment
somewhat. It is certainly an over-general-
ization to claim that Aids employed by
larger agencies (or, more precisely,
employed by agencies with the largest
number of Aids) are more fungible than
those employed by smaller agencies. Indeed
the proposal reflects an attempt to assess
carefully the suitability of including various
AILJs into an experimental corps based upon
existing agency structures, the transfera-
bility of expertise, and upon the need for
a manageable experiment. Furthermore,
because economy of scale is one of the
strongest reasons in favor of a unified corps,
it makes more sense, on that basis at least,
to combine many smaller AU contingents
than to combine a few larger ones.
Tip of the Iceberg?
The proposal for a unified corps ofAids,
which I suggest may be too inclusive (espe-
cially with respect to Social Security cases),
does have a key limitation: it does not include
presiding officers who are not Aids. This
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is a practical, even sensible, limitation since
ALJs are appointed under a common sys-
tem, possess a common degree of indepen-
dence and act in cases that Congress has
deemed to be formal proceedings subject
to the APA. 42 Nevertheless, if only to place
the ALI corps proposal in context and to
consider its possible growth, it is advisable
to consider the many other programs
involving relatively formal adjudications that
are presided over by hearing officers who
are not administrative law judges.
Some of these programs are explicitly
excepted from all of the APA's adjudica-
tion requirements, e.g., cases involving the
selection or tenure of federal employees
(except ALJs), certification of worker rep-
resentatives, or conduct of military or for-
eign affairs functions. 3 Except for these,
all other adjudicative programs are covered
by the APA, and where the adjudication is
"required to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing, "I
any hearing must be presided over by either
the agency head (a rare event) or one or
more ALJs-uness, another statute spec-
ifies that a particular category of proceed-
ings is to be presided over by designated
boards or employees." Of course, if an "on-
the-record" hearing is not required in a
program, the agency is free, within the
bounds of due process, to utilize any
employee as a presider.
It should not be surprising then that there
are some significant statutorily designated
boards and employees hearing formal, "on
the record" cases, and many presiding offi-
cers hearing less formal cases throughout
the Government."
Marvin Morse has recently identified in
these pages 342 "attorney examiners," as
classified by OPM, now hearing cases in
the Government.47 These include 119 MSPB
hearing officers,48 78 "administrative
judges" who serve on Boards of Contract
Appeals 9 in ten agencies, 51 Department
of Justice immigration judges, 40 members
of the Board of Veterans Appeals, 26 mem-
bers of various tribunals in the Department
of the Interior, 15 Social Security Admin-
istration Appeals Council members, and 7
Department of Commerce Trademark Trial
and Appeals Board members, and 6 Small
Business Administration hearing officers.
In addition to this list there are scores of
other hearing officers who serve in various
roles and capacities throughout the gov-
ernment."° Some of the more significant
clusters include the 21 full time and 27 part
time officers5 who, along with 3 ALJs,
comprise the NRC's Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board Panel; the 37 full time law-
yers with scientific background who serve
on the Boards of Patent Appeals (30) and
Patent Interferences (7) in the Department
of Commerce; 86 "attorney examiners" at
the EEOC who conduct hearings and make
recommended decisions involving equal
employment complaints against federal
agencies; 9 "appeal referees" at the Rail-
road Retirement Board; 5 presiding officers
in Department of Energy's Office of Hear-
ings and Appeals; 4 members of the Depart-
ment of HHS Grant Appeals Board;52 4 full
time hearing examiners at the Department
of Defense who hear industrial security
clearance review cases; 3 members of the
Department of State's Foreign Service
Grievance Board; and many other individ-
uals too numerous to identify.
Agencies also report many programs
involving the use of employees with other
functions who serve as part-time presiding
officers or board members. For example,
the Federal Service Impasses Panel, an
entity within the FLRA, reports a pool of
120 potential hearing officers available from
its staff to conduct factfinding hearings in
labor impasses. And the Department of
Defense utilizes over one hundred part-
time members of boards for the correction
of military records. Finally, two agencies
reported hiring presiding officers on a con-
tractual basis (Department of Education
Appeal Board, 27 of 30 members; DOD's
CHAMPUS program, 9 hearing officers).
As stated above, the proposed ALJ corps
bill ignores all of these non-ALJ hearing
officers. The only provision relating to non-
APA cases is permissive-it permits agen-
cies (and courts) to refer any case to the
corps where such a reference is found to
be desirable and appropriate.53 But Profes-
sor Harold Levinson has raised the ques-
tion of whether these non-ALJ hearing offi-
cers, who lack even the current indepen-
dence enjoyed by ALJS, should also be
brought into the corps.' The result, of
course, would be a much bigger corps, but
with the benefit that there would no longer
be distinctions between those judges who
currently function under the APA and those
who are governed by special statutes. This,
with the addition of such other Article I
courts such as the Tax Court and the Claims
Court,5 is the administrative trial court writ
large. It is certainly useful to think in these
logical, thicket-clearing terms, but before
such a braod swath is actually cut, a much
better survey of this dense underbrush is
needed.
Conclusion
There is much ferment in the field of
administrative adjudication at present. Not
only are there movements to modify the
way adjudications are performed (witness
the trend toward "alternative dispute res-
olution"),56 but renewed debates about how
best to structure administrative adjudica-
tion are also being heard. There is new
recognition that the overall scheme by which
the government decides cases-some in
Article III district courts, some in quasi-
Article III forums like bankruptcy courts
and magistrates, some in Article I courts
like the Tax Court and Claims Court, some
in traditional agencies operating under the
APA and using ALJs, some in special adju-
dicatory agencies, and some in agency
hearings presided over by non-ALls-needs
a comprehensive review. It is a healthy
development that this variegated system is
getting renewed attention, spurred by the
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debate over the proposed Federal unified
corps of administrative law judges. It would
be beneficial to fashion a manageable
experiment to try out the corps concept on
the Federal level, but this focus on the
corps bill should not obscure the reality
that the role of the ALJ has changed dra-
matically in recent years and that there is
a much larger world of non-APA, non-ALJ
adjudication in the agencies that deserves
just as much understanding and study.
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Printed as S. Doc. No. 8, 88th Cong., Ist. Sess.
(1941).
'Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch.
324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§
551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521
(1982). In 1978, the APA was amended to sub-
stitute the title "administrative law judge" for
the earlier designation, "hearing examiner." Act
of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. 95-251.
'See Musolf, supra note I at 46 ("Here the
Act accomplished the most decisive changes
"°See Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Harv.
L. Rev. 759 (1950); Thomas, The Selection of
Federal Hearing Examiners; Pressure Groups
and the Administrative Process, 59 Yale L.J.
431 (1950). For a later account by the then-Chair-
man of the Civil Service Commission, see Macy,
The APA and the Hearing Examiner: Products
of a Viable Political Society, 27 Fed. Bar. J. 351
(1967).
"See, e.g., Symposium: Administrative Law
Judges, 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 587 (1984); Sym-
posium: The Central Panel System: A New
Framework for the Use of Administrative Law
Judges, 65 Judicature 233 (November, 1981).
"Figures below are all derived from periodic
reports of the Office of Personnel Management's
Office of ALls. The January, 1979 figure was
recomputed. See Morse, The Administrative Law
Judge-A New Direction for the Corps? 30
Fed. Bar N & 1 398, 399 (1983); Lubbers, A
Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the
Idea at the Federal Level, 65 Judicature 266, 268
(1981). The October, 1982 figure is in Hearings
on S. 1275, infra note 19 at 63. The June 1984
figure has been obtained from OPM by the author.
"This includes judges from the FLRA,
FMSHRC, Labor Department, NLRB and
OSHRC.
"See Federal Administrative Law Judges
Hearings-Statistical Report for 1976-1978,
Administrative Conference of the U.S. (1980),
for an agency-by-agency analysis of caseloads.
Data for 1982-1983 were compiled by the author
from agency responses to an Administrative
Conference questionnaire dated August 22, 1983.
Responses are on file at the Administrative Con-
ference.
"See Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A
Proposal to Test the Idea at the Federal Level,
65 Judicature 266, 268-272 (1981) for an elabo-
ration on this trend.
6Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982); Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission,
30 U.S.C. § 823 (1982).
"149 U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1429 (1982).
"5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
"See Administrative Law Judge Corps Act:
Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. 25 (1983) (statement of the Federal Admin-
istrative Law Judges Conference) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 1275).
'See 129Cong. Rec. S. 6609-l0(daily ed. May
12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflinl. See also,
Heflin, Query: ShouldAdministrative Law Judges
belndependentofTheirAgencies? 67 Judicature
369 (1984). A companion bill, H.R. 3539, was
introduced by Rep. Shelby in the House of Rep-
resentatives, on June 12. 1983 and a similar bill,
H.R. 5156, was introduced on March 15, 1984
by Rep. Glickman.
"Hearings on S. 1275. supra note 19. The
hearings were held on June 23 and September
20, 1983.
"See Rich, The Central Panel System and the
Decisionmaking Independence of Administra-
tive Lau, Judges: Lessons for a Proposed Fed-
eral Program, 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 643 (1984);
M. Rich & W. Brucar, The Central Panel System
forAdministrative Law Judges: A Survey of Seven
States (1983). The eight states are California.
Colorado, Florida. Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Tennessee. and Washington.
2See Lubbers. supra note 15. at 273-275 for
a listing of pros and cons.
-4For strong statements of support see Palmer
and Bernstein, Establishing Federal Adminis-
trative Law Judges as an Independent Corps:
The Heflin Bill, 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 673 (1984);
Levant, A Unified Corps of Administrative Lam,
Judges-The Transition from a Concept to a
Reality, 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 705 (1984). Fora
rebuttal see Zankel. A Unified Corps of Federal
Administrative Law Judges is Not Needed, 6 W.
N. Eng. L. Rev. 723 (1984). All of the above
authors are Federal ALJs. See also Hearings on
S. 1275, supra, note 19 for testimony pro and
con.
"The bill does call for a two year study of the
various types and levels of agency review. S.
1275, § 3. For a recent examination of structures
of agency review of AL decisions, see Cass,
Agency Review of Administrative Lau, Judges'
Decisions, Report to the Administrative Con-
ference of the U.S. (December 1983).
"The subject of removal and discipline of ALs
has also been a hot topic lately. See Rosenblum,
Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause"
as Criterion for Removal ofAdministrative Law
Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. N. Eng.
L. Rev. 593 (1984); Timony, Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings Against Federal Administrative Law
Judges, 6 W. N. Eng. L. Rev. 807 (1984).
"Specific criticism of aspects of the bill are
contained in Levinson, The Proposed Admin-
istrative Law Judge Corps: An Incomplete But
Important Reform Effort (forthcoming) 19 N.
Eng. L. Rev. .. ___(1984). (Draft on file at the
Administrative Conference of the U.S.)
IS. 1275 § 2 (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C.
§ 564). The Glickman bill, H.R. 5156, supra note
20, provides for six initial divisions, combining
the judges at the Department of Labor, NLRB
and FLRA into a single division.
"Palmer & Bernstein, supra note 24 at 680 n.
39. 1 have assumed that "Maritime Commis-
sion" as listed in their list of agencies subsumed
under the Division of General Programs is a
misnomer since the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion is already listed under Division 1. 1 have
substituted the Small Business Administration
which is not listed on their chart. To summarize
the list: Division (1): FCC, FERC, ICC, CAB,
FMC, NRC; Division (2): OSHRC, FMSHRC,
NTSB, EPA, Interior, Commerce, Coast Guard;
Division (3): Labor; Division (4): NLRB, FLRA;
Division (5): SSA; Division (6): Agriculture,
CFTC, SEC, FTC, USITC; Division (7): DEA,
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HUD, FDA, ATF, SBA, USPS, MSPB.
•"The independence of Social Security ALJs
in the face of pressures to increase production
and to decrease agency allowance rates has been
a subject of controversy for years. See Social
Security Administrative Law Judges: Survey and
Issue Paper, Subcomm. on Social Security of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. print 1979); The Role
of the Administrative Law Judge in the Title 11
Social Security Disability Program, Report by
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government
Management of the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs, 98th Cong., I st Sess. (Committee
Print 1983).
2See Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 19 at
158 (testimony of Joseph B. Kennedy, suggest-
ing such an independent adjudicatory agency).
Two bills have been introduced in the 98th Con-
gress to create a five member Health and Human
Services Review Commission, S. 1911 (Sen.
Pryor) "A bill to ensure the independence of
certain administrative law judges"; and H.R.
3541 (Rep. Wise) (part of a more extensive revi-
sion of the Social Security Act). This proposal
differs from the "Social Security Court" bill,
introduced by Rep. Pickle, H.R. 5700 § 12, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., which would replace the Fed-
eral district courts as a forum for judicial review
of decisions of the SSA.
3See comments by the Chief Administrative
Law Judge of the Department of Labor, in Litt,
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3433 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1982).
"See Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F 2d. 376 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3088 (1983)
(members of Benefits Review Board may be
removed at the discretion of the Secretary of
Labor).
"6The NLRB general counsel serves a term of
four years and, in practice at least, has been
insulated from removal for the length of the term,
7 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982). The FLRA general
counsel serves a term of five years, but is remov-
able by the President, 5 U.S.C. § 7104(0(1) (1982).
"7See Zankel, supra note 24, at 723 n. 3., and
Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 19, at 175-190
(statement ofJoseph B. Kennedy containing poll
of agency ALJs re S. 1275-10 NLRB ALJs
voted yes and 20 no).
'
5
Lubbers, supra note 15. In this proposal I
have also excluded the EPA (as a regulatory
agency), the FLRA (due to its internal separa-
tion), and the NTSB and MSPB (as already inde-
pendent adjudicatory bodies).
"See Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 19 at
113 (statement of Loren A. Smith).
'Id. at 119.
4'Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 19 at 138
(statement of Joseph A. Morris).
42For a description of the ALJ program's oper-
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Judges: A Focus on our Invisible Judiciary, 33
Ad. L. Rev. 109 (1981). The OPM has recently
revised its examination and selection proce-
dures, see Office of Personnel Management,
Administrative Law Judge (Examination
Announcement No. 318) (May, 1984).
*5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982).
"Ild.
-5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1982).
'At some point, of course, these less formal
proceedings shade into that rather uncharted mass
of agency action known as informal action. See
Gardner, The Informal Actions of the Federal
Government, 26 Am. U.L. Rev. 799 (1977). For
the purpose of this article, and the questionnaire
to agencies, supra note 14, an adjudication pro-
gram attains a sufficient degree of formality to
be included if it offers an opportunity for an oral
fact-finding hearing before a presiding official
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Thus, deci-
sions on FOIA requests, camping permits or air
traffic control, while technically adjudications,
would be distinguishable from that discussed in
this article. Creating clear and workable distinc-
tions between these various levels of non-APA
adjudications is a project for another day. For
one useful attempt, see Verkuil. A Study of
Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Chi.
L. Rev, 739 (1976).
'Morse, supra note 12, at 400.
'As of August 1984, there were 96 MSPB
hearing officers. Telephone interview with
MSPB's Office of Administrative Law Judges,
August 1984.
47These judges are appointed pursuant to the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978,41 U.S.C. §§601-
613 (1982). The Act provides that the judges are
to be appointed in the same manner as admin-
istrative law judges, provided that they have at
least five years' experience in public contract
law. Id. § 607(b). The boards review appeals
from decisions of agency contracting officers,
but, unlike ALfs, the boards' decisions are final
agency action. Id. § 607(g). The largest board is
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
which has thirty three members and disposes of
approximately 1,000 appeals annually (DOD
questionnaire response, supra note 14).
"Why these officers are not classified as
"attorney examiners" by OPM is not known.
This information is drawn from responses to
Administrative Conference questionnaire, suprn
note 14. Professor Larry Bakken of Hamline
University School of Law is currently studying
these programs for the Administrative Confer-
ence.
'Eleven of the full time officers and six of the
part time officers are attorneys. Telephone inter-
view with NRC Chief Judge Cotter's Office, July
1984.
"2For a comprehensive description of the var-
ious grant dispute resolution procedures, see
Steinberg, Federal Grant Dispute Resolution,
Report to the Administrative Conference of the
United States, printed in Mezines, Stein and
Graff, Administrative Law (chapters 53 and 54)
(1983).
" . 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess § 2 (1983) (pro-
posing codification at 5, U.S.C. § 568(d)).
"Levinson, supra note 27 at __ .
"See 28 U.S.C. §§ 271 et seq. (Claims Court):
26 U.S.C. § 7441 (Tax Court).
'The Administrative Conference is currently
studying the use of alternative dispute resolution
techniques (e.g., arbitration, mediation, concil-
iation, mini-trials, etc.) by Federal agencies.
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